S.001 | Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024

[Falnor]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Ms. Reyes (for herself, with thanks to Ms. Warren, Mr. Casey, and Ms. Baldwin and others), introduces the following:

A BILL

To make price gouging unlawful, to expand the ability of the Federal Trade Commission to seek permanent injunctions and equitable relief, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the “Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024".

SEC. 2. Definitions.

In this Act:

(1) COMMISSION.—The term “Commission” means the Federal Trade Commission.

(2) CRITICAL TRADING PARTNER.—The term “critical trading partner” means a person that has the ability to restrict, impede, or foreclose access to the inputs, customers, partners, goods, services, technology, platform, facilities, or tools of such person in a way that harms competition or limits the ability of the customers or suppliers of such person to carry out business effectively.

(3) EXCEPTIONAL MARKET SHOCK.—The term “exceptional market shock” means—

(A) any change or imminently threatened (as determined under guidance issued by the Commission) change in the market for a good or service resulting from a natural disaster, failure or shortage of electric power or other source of energy, concerted labor action, lockout, civil disorder, war, military action, national or local emergency, public health emergency, or any other cause of an atypical disruption in such market; or

(B) any period of time during which the President has declared a major disaster or emergency under section 401 or 502, respectively, of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5170, 5191).

(4) GOOD OR SERVICE.—The term “good or service” means any good or service offered in commerce.

(5) STATE.—The term “State” means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, each commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States, and each federally recognized Indian Tribe.

(6) ULTIMATE PARENT ENTITY.—The term “ultimate parent entity” has the meaning given such term in section 801.1 of title 16, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulation).

SEC. 3. Prevention of price gouging.

(a) In general.—It shall be unlawful for a person to sell or offer for sale a good or service at a grossly excessive price, regardless of the person’s position in a supply chain or distribution network.

(b) Affirmative defense.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to the sale, or offering for sale, of a good or service by a person if—

(A) the person’s ultimate parent entity earned less than $100,000,000 in gross revenue from goods or services provided in the United States during the 12-month period preceding the sale or offer that allegedly violates subsection (a); and

(B) the person demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the increase in the price of the good or service involved is directly attributable to additional costs that are—

(i) not within the control of the person; and

(ii) incurred by the person in procuring, acquiring, distributing, or providing the good or service.

(2) INFLATION ADJUSTMENT.—Beginning on January 1, 2025, the Commission shall annually adjust the amount specified in paragraph (1)(A) by the percentage change in the consumer price index for all urban consumers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the 12-month period ending on December 31 of the previous year.

(c) Presumptive violations.—A person shall be presumed to be in violation of subsection (a) if, during an exceptional market shock, it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the person—

(1) (A) has unfair leverage; or

(B) is using the effects or circumstances related to an exceptional market shock as a pretext to increase prices; and

(2) regardless of the person's position in a supply chain or distribution network, sells or offers for sale a good or service at an excessive price compared to—

(A) the average price at which the good or service was sold or offered for sale by the person in the market during the 120-day period preceding such exceptional market shock; or

(B) the price at which the good or service was sold or offered for sale by competing sellers in the market during the exceptional market shock.

(d) Rebuttal.—A person may rebut a presumption under subsection (c) if the person demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the increase in the price of the good or service involved is directly attributable to additional costs that are—

(1) not within the control of the person; and

(2) incurred by the person in procuring, acquiring, distributing, or providing the good or service.

(e) Unfair leverage.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—

(A) CHARACTERISTICS OF UNFAIR LEVERAGE.—For purposes of subsection (c), a person has unfair leverage if the person—

(i) earned at least $1,000,000,000 in gross revenue from goods or services provided in the United States during the 12-month period preceding the sale or offer that allegedly violates subsection (a);

(ii) discriminates between otherwise equal trading partners in the same market by applying differential prices or conditions;

(iii) is a critical trading partner;

(iv) engages in unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices;

(v) has a dominant position in—

(I) the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce;

(II) any labor market; or

(III) the furnishing of any service; or

(vi) has a characteristic described in a rule promulgated by the Commission that further defines unfair leverage.

(B) PRESUMPTION OF A DOMINANT POSITION.—For purposes of subparagraph (A)(v), a person shall be presumed to have a dominant position if—

(i) evidence shows that the person is not constrained by meaningful competitive pressures; or

(ii) the person—

(I) has a share of 40 percent or greater of a relevant market as a seller; or

(II) has a share of 30 percent or greater of a relevant market as a buyer.

(2) INFLATION ADJUSTMENT.—Beginning on January 1, 2025, the Commission shall annually adjust the amount specified in paragraph (1)(A)(i) by the percentage change in the consumer price index for all urban consumers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the 12-month period ending on December 31 of the previous year.

(f) Enforcement by the Commission.—

(1) UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES.—A violation of this section or a regulation promulgated under this section shall be treated as a violation of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)).

(2) POWERS OF THE COMMISSION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided by subparagraphs (D) and (E), the Commission shall enforce this section in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) were incorporated into and made a part of this section.

(B) PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.—Any person who violates this section or a regulation promulgated under this section shall be subject to the penalties and entitled to the privileges and immunities provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.).

(C) AUTHORITY PRESERVED.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the Commission under any other provision of law.

(D) INDEPENDENT LITIGATION AUTHORITY.—If the Commission has reason to believe that a person has violated this section, the Commission may bring a civil action in any appropriate United States district court to—

(i) enjoin any further such violation by such person;

(ii) enforce compliance with this section;

(iii) obtain a permanent, temporary, or preliminary injunction;

(iv) obtain civil penalties;

(v) obtain damages, restitution, or other compensation on behalf of aggrieved consumers; or

(vi) obtain any other appropriate equitable relief.

(E) CIVIL PENALTIES.—In addition to any other penalties as may be prescribed by law, each violation of this section shall carry a civil penalty not to exceed—

(i) if the person who committed the violation does not have unfair leverage (as described in subsection (e)), the lesser of—

(I) $25,000; or

(II) 5 percent of the revenues earned by the person's ultimate parent entity during the preceding 12-month period; or

(ii) if the person who committed the violation has unfair leverage, 5 percent of the revenues earned by the person's ultimate parent entity during the preceding 12-month period.

(F) RULEMAKING.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The Commission may promulgate in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code, such rules as may be necessary to carry out this section, including guidelines regarding what circumstances constitute an exceptional market shock or guidelines that provide for additional characteristics that demonstrate that a person has unfair leverage.

(ii) REQUIRED GUIDANCE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall promulgate regulations regarding violations of this section, which shall include guidelines on, for the purposes of this Act, what constitutes a market, a grossly excessive price for a good or service, and an excessive price for a good or service.

(iii) DEFINITION OF GROSSLY EXCESSIVE PRICE.—

(I) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of subsection (a) and the guidelines on what constitutes a grossly excessive price described in clause (ii), the Commission shall define the term “grossly excessive price” using any metric it deems appropriate.

(II) DEFINITION CONSIDERATIONS.—In formulating the definition in subclause (I), the Commission shall consider whether to provide that such term shall include a price for a good or service that is an amount equal to or greater than 120 percent (or a lesser percentage, as determined appropriate by the Commission) of the average price for such good or service in the market during the 6-month period preceding the sale or offer that allegedly violates subsection (a).

(g) Enforcement by state attorneys general.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—If the attorney general of a State has reason to believe that any person has violated or is violating this section, the attorney general, in addition to any authority it may have to bring an action in State court under the laws of such State, may bring a civil action in any appropriate United States district court or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, including a State court, to—

(A) enjoin any further such violation by such person;

(B) enforce compliance with this section;

(C) obtain a permanent, temporary, or preliminary injunction;

(D) obtain civil penalties;

(E) obtain damages, restitution, or other compensation on behalf of residents of the State; or

(F) obtain any other appropriate equitable relief.

(2) RIGHTS OF THE COMMISSION.—

(A) NOTICE TO THE COMMISSION.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in clause (ii), before initiating a civil action under paragraph (1), the attorney general of the State involved shall provide to the Commission a written notice of such action and a copy of the complaint for such action.

(ii) EXCEPTION.—If the attorney general determines that it is not feasible to provide the notice described in clause (i) before initiating a civil action under this subsection, the attorney general shall provide written notice of the action and a copy of the complaint to the Commission immediately upon initiating the civil action.

(iii) JURISDICTION NOT AFFECTED.—An attorney general failing to provide notice under clause (i) shall not prevent the attorney general or the Commission from having jurisdiction over a civil action brought under paragraph (1) or imperil such civil action in any way.

(B) INTERVENTION.—The Commission may—

(i) intervene in any civil action brought by the attorney general, official, or agency of a State under this subsection; and

(ii) upon intervening—

(I) be heard on all matters arising in the civil action; and

(II) file petitions for appeal of a decision in the civil action.

(3) INVESTIGATORY POWERS.—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to prevent the attorney general of a State from exercising the powers conferred on the attorney general by the laws of the State to conduct investigations, to administer oaths or affirmations, or to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary or other evidence.

(4) LIMITATION ON STATE ACTION WHILE FEDERAL ACTION IS PENDING.—If the Commission has instituted a civil action for a violation of this section, no State attorney general may, without the approval of the Commission, bring an action under this subsection during the pendency of that action against any defendant named in the complaint of the Commission for any violation of this section alleged in the complaint.

(5) RELATIONSHIP WITH STATE-LAW CLAIMS.—If the attorney general of a State has authority to bring an action under State law directed at acts or practices that also violate this section, the attorney general may assert a claim under State law and a claim under this section in the same civil action.

(6) VENUE; SERVICE OF PROCESS.—

(A) VENUE.—Any action brought under paragraph (1) may be brought in—

(i) the district court of the United States that meets applicable requirements relating to venue under section 1391 of title 28, United States Code; or

(ii) another court of competent jurisdiction.

(B) SERVICE OF PROCESS.—In an action brought under paragraph (1), process may be served in any district in which—

(i) the defendant is an inhabitant, may be found, or transacts business; or

(ii) venue is proper under section 1391 of title 28, United States Code.

(7) ACTIONS BY OTHER STATE OFFICIALS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—In addition to civil actions brought by an attorney general under paragraph (1), any other officer of a State who is authorized by the State to do so may bring a civil action under paragraph (1), subject to the same requirements and limitations that apply under this subsection to civil actions brought by attorneys general.

(B) SAVINGS PROVISION.—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to prohibit an authorized official of a State from initiating or continuing any proceeding in a court of the State for a violation of any civil or criminal law of the State.

(8) EFFECT ON STATE LAWS.—Nothing in this section shall preempt or otherwise affect any State or local law.

SEC. 4. Disclosures in SEC filings.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) COVERED ISSUER.—The term “covered issuer” means an issuer that—

(A) has a covered quarter; and

(B) in the quarter following the covered quarter described in subparagraph (A), is required to submit Form 10–Q or Form 10–K.

(2) COVERED QUARTER.—The term “covered quarter” means a quarter during which there is an exceptional market shock.

(3) FORM 10–K.—The term “Form 10–K” means the form described in section 249.310 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor regulation.

(4) FORM 10–Q.—The term “Form 10–Q” means the form described in section 240.15d–13 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor regulation.

(5) ISSUER.—The term “issuer” has the meaning given the term in section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)).

(b) Inclusion in filing.—Each covered issuer, in each Form 10–K or Form 10–Q that the covered issuer is required to file in a quarter following a covered quarter, shall include in the filing the following information with respect to that covered quarter, as compared with the quarter preceding that covered quarter:

(1) The percentage change in the volume of goods or services sold, and the percentage change in the average sales price of those goods or services, which shall be broken down by material product categories, when relevant, and presented in a tabular format.

(2) The gross margins of the covered issuer, which shall be broken down by material product categories, when relevant, and presented in a tabular format.

(3) Presented in tabular format, the share of the increase in revenue of the covered issuer that is attributable to—

(A) a change in the cost of goods or services sold by the covered issuer; and

(B) a change in the volume of goods or services sold by the covered issuer.

(4) The percentage change in the costs of the covered issuer, which shall be broken down by category and presented in tabular format.

(5) In dollars, the change in the costs of the covered issuer and the revenue of the covered issuer, which shall be presented in tabular format.

(6) A detailed narrative disclosure of the pricing strategy of the covered issuer, which shall include—

(A) an explanation for any increase in the gross margins of material product categories, including all material causes for such an increase, an explanation of how each such material cause affected such an increase, and a description of the relative importance of each such material cause with respect to such an increase;

(B) an explanation for the decisions made by the covered issuer with respect to the prices of goods or services sold by the covered issuer;

(C) if the covered issuer increased prices at a rate that was greater than the rate at which the costs incurred by the covered issuer increased, the rationale and objectives for increasing prices in such a manner; and

(D) a description of conditions under which the covered issuer plans to modify pricing after the date on which the covered issuer submits the filing.

(c) Regulations.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall issue final regulations, or amend existing regulations of the Commission, to carry out this section.

(d) Effective date.—This section shall take effect on the date on which the Securities and Exchange Commission issues final regulations under subsection (c) or completes the amendments required under that subsection, as applicable.

SEC. 5. Funding.

In addition to amounts otherwise available, there is appropriated to the Commission for fiscal year 2024, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, $1,000,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 2032, for carrying out work of the Commission.

Quote

PLAIN ENGLISH SUMMARY:

• Prohibits price gouging at the federal level – anytime and anywhere. The proposed bill would clarify that price gouging is an unfair and deceptive practice under the FTC Act. It would allow the FTC and state attorneys general to stop sellers from charging a grossly excessive price, regardless of where the price gouging occurs in a supply chain or distribution network.
• Creates an affirmative defense for small businesses acting in good faith. Small and local businesses sometimes must raise prices in response to crisis-driven increases in their costs because they have little negotiating power with their price-gouging suppliers. This affirmative defense protects small businesses earning less than $100 million from frivolous litigation if they show legitimate cost increases.
• Targets dominant companies that have exploited the pandemic to boost profits. The bill would create a rebuttable presumption of price gouging against firms that exercise unfair leverage and companies that brag about increasing prices during periods of inflation.
• Requires public companies to clearly disclose costs and pricing strategies. During periods of exceptional market shock, the bill requires public companies to transparently disclose and explain changes in their cost of goods sold, gross margins, and pricing strategies in their quarterly SEC filings.
• Provides additional funding to the FTC. The bill appropriates $1 billion in funding to the FTC to carry out its work. 

 

Edited 8 hours ago by Baudin

[camilodeso]

CS

[Baudin]

Debate begins.

[Falnor]

Madam President,

I rise today to speak in strong support of the Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024. This bill is a critical step in addressing a growing crisis that is affecting everyday Americans: the unjust exploitation of market shocks to drive up prices and pad corporate profits.

We’ve all seen it—when inflation spikes or a natural disaster hits, many hard-working families find themselves struggling even more as the price of essential goods and services skyrockets. From groceries to gas, corporate greed is taking advantage of people when they are at their most vulnerable. Meanwhile, these same companies post record profits quarter after quarter, all while millions of Americans live paycheck to paycheck.

This bill takes a stand against that. It will empower the Federal Trade Commission to crack down on companies that engage in price gouging by abusing their dominant position in the market. The bill makes it clear that no one, whether they control 40% of a product's market or operate in a space with little competition, will be able to exploit the public’s hardship for financial gain.

It also enforces transparency, holding companies accountable by requiring detailed disclosures of any price increases that go beyond reasonable adjustments. This transparency will expose those who unfairly manipulate markets for profit while hiding behind the complexities of supply chains and inflationary pressures.

Most importantly, this bill offers real consequences—penalties that ensure corporations can’t view price gouging as a mere 'cost of doing business.' This includes civil penalties of up to 5% of a company’s revenue in cases where unfair leverage is proven. We must send a strong message: manipulating markets for profit at the expense of the public will not be tolerated.

At its core, this legislation is about fairness and accountability. It is about ensuring that when a crisis hits, no one profits from the pain and suffering of the American people. And it is about ensuring that those with the least power—the working families who keep our country running—are not left to bear the brunt of unchecked corporate greed.

I urge my colleagues to stand with the American people, stand with fairness, and stand against price gouging by supporting this crucial legislation. Thank you, Madam President. I yield the floor.

[Butcher]

Mr. President.

Let me rise to say that it takes a lot of courage to come out and acknowledge that the last three years under President Biden has been a disaster. After all, the sponsor has stated that disasters can lead to increased prices. So, glad to see that the sponsor is finally on the same page as everybody else in America dealing with inflation and the disaster that has been this presidency.

Nonetheless, I believe the gentle lady from Nevada is being somewhat misleading about the intent of this bill. I’ve become very familiar with the rhetoric being pushed in the more left-leaning echo chamber and they will tell you that this is designed to address so-called price-gouging “anytime and anywhere.” And their definition of price gouging is absurd. Stop pretending that this is designed to address price gouging in disasters. We are not stupid.

I’ve heard Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky of Illinois talk about price gouging in the grocery industry with relationship to this. Yet, the current profit margin for grocery stores across this country has been about 1.6 percent. That’s price gouging to those who want this bill passed. A 1.6 percent profit.

In the end, what we have here are price controls. Anyone who knows the history of that knows the catastrophic failure of that policy. In the early 1970s, food yields went down 15-25 percent in this country. Wheat was particularly hard hit. A nation that could once feed the world became almost incapable of feeding itself. The price controls under President Nixon may have been popular to some, but when the aftermath was a turbulent agricultural sector that saw bankruptcies and economic decline we know what a failure was and we want to do the same thing again with this legislation.

And for those who hate big corporations, the bankruptcies that will come from this will be the family farms while large-scale agribusiness corporations will weather these asinine policies. You will be left with large corporate farms when the dust clears.

The reality of economic life is that we have had a deluge of federal spending that has driven abnormal demand outside of traditional supply-and-demand market forces. We’ve seen energy costs rise, leading to cost-push inflationary cycles. And in the past three years, this administration has taken a turn from the Trump administration’s rollback of the regulatory state to inflict regulatory cost.

And yet, this bill wants to pretend that the market forces emanating from that economic reality means treating a symptom not the cause.  This policy failed in the 1970s. It will fail today.

I yield.

[Falnor]

Madam President,

This bill does not scapegoat the market for inflation but addresses one specific aspect: price gouging during emergencies when families and communities are at their most vulnerable. To suggest that this bill represents a broad attack on markets distorts its purpose. But I assume the Senator from Texas already knows this since he's a smart guy.

This legislation is narrowly focused on preventing predatory practices in times of crisis, not imposing sweeping price controls across all industries, as the Senator from Texas claims. It aims to protect consumers from egregious price hikes on necessities like food, fuel, and medical supplies when they need them most. This is not a radical or new concept. Thirty-nine states already have laws against price gouging during emergencies, yet we are still witnessing abuses that disproportionately harm working families. Federal standards would create consistency and fairness across the board.

Now, let’s talk about this myth that grocery stores with a 1.6% profit margin are the target of this bill. The Senator claims that such a low margin constitutes price gouging under this legislation, but that is a blatant mischaracterization. We are not talking about standard operating profits; no one is accusing grocery stores of gouging customers with razor-thin margins. The issue is when prices are artificially inflated to exploit people in desperate situations. This is about bad actors, not honest businesses.

History has indeed shown us that price controls can fail under certain conditions, like in the 1970s, but we must not conflate different economic policies. The price controls of that era were broad and ill-conceived, applied in a sweeping manner without regard to the specific needs of a crisis situation. This bill does not seek to impose blanket price controls but instead targets only situations of genuine emergency. It aims to prevent profiteering, not control everyday market fluctuations.

And let me be clear: the claim that this legislation will lead to bankruptcies in family farms is not supported by evidence. Price gouging protections have existed in many states for years without wiping out family farms. In fact, it is often large agribusinesses that have the power to raise prices during disasters, while smaller, local businesses suffer from the disruptions in supply chains. Protecting consumers from price gouging ensures a level playing field for smaller businesses, including family farms.

The Senator from Texas attempts to shift the blame for inflation to federal spending and energy policy under this administration. But this ignores the broader global economic trends, supply chain disruptions, and the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is about fairness, protection, and decency. In times of crisis, Americans should not have to worry about whether they can afford life-saving medicine, basic groceries, or fuel.

This bill seeks to prevent abuse, not interfere with honest commerce. It’s about stopping the worst kinds of market failures when the stakes are highest. The only way we can fail today is by allowing fearmongering to prevent this body from adopting a policy that will protect American families from the worst instances of corporate greed and price-gouging. I urge my colleagues not to give in or give up, but to support the bill before us.

I yield.

[KDD]

Madam President,

It would be naive to think there weren't, and are not, bad actors that have taken advantage of the pandemic to fatten their wallets at the expense of others. The pandemic has unfortunately represented a massive transfer of wealth from the have nots to the haves. That is appalling. When it comes to laws preventing price gouging, there are laws on the books to prevent this is very specific situations. It is because of legislation that right before a huge blizzard, Home Depot can't change the price of a shovel from $20 to $200, or right before a hurricane Lowe's can't change the price of plywood by 10 fold. Those are very specific situations and all you really need are eyes and ears to see when price gouging happens. So it is clear to me that legislatively price gauging can be stomped out.

 

I do have concerns about sweeping legislation though. Having public companies disclose the cost of inputs and pricing strategies, well, I remember a certain national pizza chain adding an "Obamacare surcharge" on everyone's bill, just to propagate their ultra right wing views. And I am also concerned that gauging doesn't necessarily happen at the point of sale. If you go the grocery store and the price of your favorite potato chip doubled, whose fault is that? The store? The manufacturer? The farmer? The price of deisel? The price of the fertilizer? The heathcare costs of the truck driver? I don't think most people are going to pick up the disclosure and say "well, the 11 cents of this bag of chips going to utilize costs at the processing plant is way off base so I am being gouged".

 

Call me undeclared at this point but this is a conversation worth having. Price gauging does happen, and you'd have to be a fool to think otherwise. The question is who is actually doing the gauging and how to best correct that.

I yield

 

[Albion]

Mr. President,

I stand before you today to discuss a piece of legislation that touches on one of the most delicate issues we face in times of crisis: the balance between free enterprise and consumer protection. The Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024 seeks to address a genuine and pressing concern—the exploitation of consumers during moments of national emergency. No one in this chamber, myself included, wishes to see the American people subjected to predatory pricing when they are already suffering from disasters or disruptions beyond their control.

And yet, as with all legislation that aims to intervene in the market, we must proceed with caution. We must ensure that we are targeting those bad actors who truly seek to exploit, and not those businesses simply trying to keep their doors open under extraordinary pressures. In its current form, this bill does not strike that balance. It has the potential to do harm where no harm was intended.

That is why I have proposed several amendments—amendments that will refine this legislation, so it accomplishes its goals without overreaching or stifling legitimate business activity.

First, we must protect our small and medium-sized enterprises. These businesses are the heart and soul of our economy. They employ millions of Americans and are often the first to feel the squeeze when disaster strikes. Under the current draft, businesses with less than $100 million in revenue are given an affirmative defense to price gouging claims. But in today’s economy, that threshold is too low.

I propose we raise that threshold to $250 million. A business making $100 million in revenue is not the corporate giant some may imagine. It could be a regional supplier or a family-owned operation with a narrow margin for error. We must not lump these businesses in with multinationals, and we must give them the room to adjust their prices in times of crisis without the constant threat of legal action.

Next, let’s talk about what we mean by “grossly excessive prices.” This term is at the heart of the bill, but its definition is problematic. Currently, a business is presumed guilty of price gouging if it raises prices more than 120 percent above the average of the preceding six months. I understand the impulse behind this, but we must recognize that in moments of real crisis, market volatility can be swift and dramatic.

I propose we raise this threshold to 150 percent. Why? Because during times of exceptional market shocks—such as a natural disaster or a major supply chain disruption—prices do rise, and not always due to gouging. A rise of 20 percent might sound excessive on paper, but in reality, businesses are often facing skyrocketing costs themselves. By raising the threshold, we can ensure that the law targets true exploitation without penalizing businesses that are simply adapting to difficult circumstances.

And speaking of those exceptional market shocks, we need to be clearer about what qualifies as one. As it stands, the definition of an “exceptional market shock” is too broad. It includes “any atypical disruption,” which could potentially cover minor fluctuations in supply and demand that don’t warrant this kind of government intervention.

I propose we add the phrase “of significant and sustained impact” to the definition. This would ensure that only truly extraordinary disruptions trigger the provisions of this bill. We cannot afford to allow minor market changes to activate such sweeping powers, nor should we ask businesses to operate under constant fear of being punished for simply adjusting to normal market conditions.

Now, the Federal Trade Commission. This bill grants the FTC enormous power to enforce its provisions, including the ability to impose civil penalties and seek injunctions against businesses. While I respect the vital role the FTC plays, we cannot allow such a broad mandate without checks and balances.

That’s why I propose an independent oversight mechanism, so any action taken by the FTC under this bill would be subject to review. The FTC’s powers must be tempered by accountability, especially when the livelihoods of businesses are at stake. We must make sure that enforcement is fair, and that businesses are not caught in a regulatory dragnet without recourse.

Let’s also consider the businesses that are themselves facing severe disruptions. Many businesses, especially those reliant on global supply chains, may see their costs rise dramatically during a crisis—whether due to trade barriers, logistical blockages, or natural disasters. These businesses should not be penalized for passing on those costs to consumers.

I propose that we allow an affirmative defense for businesses facing substantial, documented supply chain disruptions. If a company can show that their price increases are directly tied to rising costs beyond their control, we should give them the benefit of the doubt. This is about fairness—about recognizing that businesses, too, are affected by the same crises that impact consumers.

And, finally, I believe that the provisions of this bill that apply to “exceptional market shocks” should not be permanent. I propose adding a sunset clause, so that every five years Congress would need to reauthorize these provisions. This ensures that we revisit the bill’s necessity and appropriateness as market conditions evolve.

The last thing we want is for temporary measures, designed to address temporary problems, to remain in place indefinitely. By adding this sunset clause, we can ensure that our response to crises remains both timely and appropriate.

Before I conclude, one final amendment that I believe is critical: national security must come first. During times of crisis, the government may need to purchase goods or services quickly, and prices for these items may rise due to the nature of the emergency. We should exempt goods and services related to national security from the provisions of this bill. If the Department of Defense needs to procure critical materials at a higher price during a crisis, we must allow that flexibility. The safety and security of our nation cannot be held hostage to price regulations.

Mr. President,

We can protect consumers without stifling businesses. We can prevent price gouging without disrupting the very market mechanisms that make our economy strong. I believe the amendments I have proposed today strike the right balance. They protect the integrity of the market while ensuring that those who would exploit moments of national crisis are held accountable

Therefore, I move the following amendments, to be considered separately:

Albion 1: Raising the SME Protection Threshold

Amendment to Section 3(b)(1)(A) of the Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024:

Strike “$100,000,000” and insert “$250,000,000”.

Albion 2: Tightening the Definition of “Grossly Excessive Prices”

Amendment to Section 3(f)(3)(iii)(II) of the Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024:

Strike “120 percent” and insert “150 percent”.

Albion 3: Clarifying the Definition of “Exceptional Market Shock”

Amendment to Section 2(3)(A) of the Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024:

Insert “of significant and sustained impact” after “atypical disruption”.

Albion 4: Limiting the Federal Trade Commission’s Powers of Enforcement

Amendment to Section 3(f)(2)(A) of the Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024:

Insert after “the Commission shall enforce this section”:
“All actions taken by the Commission under this section shall be subject to review by an independent oversight board to ensure compliance with fair market practices.”

Albion 5: Exception for Businesses with Substantial Supply Chain Disruptions

Amendment to Section 3(d) of the Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024:

Insert a new subsection (3) as follows:
“(3) If the person demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the increase in price is attributable to substantial, documented supply chain disruptions outside the person’s control, including international trade barriers, logistical blockages, or natural disasters, the presumption in subsection (a) shall not apply.”

Albion 6: Sunset Clause for Exceptional Market Shock Provisions

Amendment to Section 3(c) of the Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024:

Insert after Section 3(c) the following:
“(e) All provisions regarding exceptional market shock (subsections (a) and (c)) shall be reviewed and subject to reauthorization by Congress every five years.”

Amendment 7: Exemption for National Security and Defense

Amendment to Section 3(a) of the Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024:

Insert at the end of Section 3(a):
“The provisions of this section shall not apply to the pricing of goods or services directly related to national security or defense if such pricing is determined to be in the best interest of national security by the Secretary of Defense.”

I urge my colleagues to support these amendments and to help pass a bill that works for both consumers and businesses alike.

Thank you, and I yield the floor.

[Butcher]

Mr. President.

We came out of a national crisis in 2021. COVID was a terrible thing that we had to respond to. The result was a large number of states and local governments shutting down "normal commerce." Many small businesses were ruined. In the aftermath of that, we saw inflation rear its ugly head. That was when price controls became a point of discussion. So, while the sponsor is telling us that this is designed to address localized areas of disaster-specific areas, this bill creates a power that can lead to bad policy like price controls. 

I know that this legislation is supported by the senior senator from Massachusetts. In her public relations regarding this legislation, she has said nothing about disaster areas but has talked about corporate greed. The same thing from the senior senator from Wisconsin. 

So, my suggestion would be this. If you don't want members of this body to believe this bill is about broad-based price controls, then don't talk about this as a bill for broad-based price controls. Hell, they're talking about "shrinkflation" and I'm pretty sure the size of Snickers bars has nothing to do with jacking up bottled water prices in tornado alley.

Even if this not intended to address anything other than post-disaster price-gouging, it can be taken on that path. The surest way to avoid that is to not give that power to be misused and vote down this bill.

I yield.

[Butcher]

Mr. President.

I would like to bring an example for my concerns. This legislation states "Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall promulgate regulations regarding violations of this section, which shall include guidelines on, for the purposes of this Act, what constitutes a market, a grossly excessive price for a good or service, and an excessive price for a good or service."

In that regulatory capacity, the federal government is not limited to actions relating to declared federal disasters. It is broad regulatory power to address "gouging anytime and anywhere." It is not tied specifically to disaster areas. This bill is bad policy.

I yield.

[Albion]

Madam President,

I thank my colleague, Senator Butcher, for raising an important concern about the scope of regulatory powers in this bill. His example highlights a genuine risk—that the Federal Trade Commission could, under this legislation, exert broad authority to intervene in markets under conditions not necessarily tied to disasters or declared emergencies. I agree that this is a significant issue, and I share his concern about the potential for the federal government to regulate pricing “anytime and anywhere,” far beyond the intent of the bill.

That’s precisely why I proposed my third amendment—to refine the definition of an “exceptional market shock.” As the bill is currently written, the language refers to any “atypical disruption,” which is far too vague. My amendment clarifies that an exceptional market shock must be “of significant and sustained impact.” By introducing this more precise language, we can ensure that the regulatory powers triggered by this bill will only come into play during genuine crises—times when the market is truly being distorted by extraordinary events, not just temporary fluctuations.

Senator Butcher is right to emphasize the importance of protecting businesses from regulatory overreach, and I believe my amendment strikes the necessary balance. It limits the FTC’s intervention to moments of substantial disruption, the type of market chaos that arises from natural disasters, war, or severe public health crises. By doing so, we prevent the kind of regulatory creep that could extend this law’s reach far beyond its intended purpose.

Madam President, I urge my colleagues to consider this amendment seriously. It addresses the valid concerns raised by Senator Butcher and ensures that we are targeting the real moments of market exploitation without giving the federal government carte blanche to interfere in pricing during normal times.

I yield the floor.